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MECHANISM DESIGN IN M&A AUCTIONS
BY STEVEN J. BRAMS* & JOSHUA R. MITTs"
ABSTRACT

The recent controversy over "Don'tAsk, Don't Waive" standstills in
M&A practice highlights the need to apply mechanism design to changeof-control transactions. In this Article, we propose a novel two-stage
auction procedure that induces honest bidding among participantswhile
potentiallyyielding a higher saleprice than an open ascending,a sealed-bid
firstprice,or a Vickrey second-priceauction. Ourprocedurebalancesdeal
certainty with value maximization through the Nobel Prize-winning
principle of incentive compatibility, making participation in the M&A
auction and honest disclosure of reservationprices in the parties' interests
ratherthan relyingsolely on heavy-handedex-post enforcement. Moreover,
the social benefits of our two-stage auction mechanism-greater
transparencyregardingthe distribution of bids, avoidance of the winner's
curse, certainty in the M&A auctionenvironment,andfairnessto buyers and
sellers-justify reduced judicial scrutiny of transactions utilizing the
procedure under Revlon and Chancellor Strine's recent dicta in
Ancestry.com.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Boards of directors of target companies in merger-and-acquisition
("M&A") transactions face a recurring challenge between maximizing the
sale price of the firm and promoting deal certainty.' To prevent interlopers'
from placing topping bids after a merger agreement has been signed, target
firms are increasingly utilizing ever-more-restrictive standstills, which are
agreements with potential bidders to make offers solely through a formal
auction process.' The recent trend toward "Don't Ask, Don't Waive"
("DADW") standstills takes these deal protections to a new level by
prohibiting bidders from even requesting-and target boards from even
considering-a waiver of the standstill.'
However, as the recent cases of In re Complete Genomics, Inc.
ShareholderLitigation and In reAncestry.com ShareholdersLitigation have
shown, Delaware courts are suspicious of devices that prevent a target finn's
board of directors from considering subsequent offers for the company at a
higher price.' While the justification for standstills seems plausible on its

'See Christina M. Sautter, Promises Made To Be Broken? StandstillAgreementsInChange

of ControlTransactions, 37 DEL. J.CORP. L. 929, 932-33 (2013) ("A board's Revlon duties, along
with the possible protections afforded to deal protection devices under Unocal, may create an
irreconcilable conflict during the pre-closing period if a third party attempts to overbid.").
2
An interloper is "a person who interferes or meddles in the affairs of others." Interloper
Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/interloper?s-t (last visited
Oct. 18, 2009).
3
See Sautter, supra note 1, at 931-32; see also William G. Lawlor, Taming the Tiger:
Difficult StandstillAgreement Issues for Targets, DECHERT 7 (July-August 2007), available at

http://www.dechert.com/files/Publication/c224al9d-bf7440f8-96dl-38f2627a483d/Presentation/
PublicationAttachmentle58245bl-30cb-4ee2-833a-3cedd2585bf3/C%26SLawlor-Tamingthe
Tiger.pdf ("Recognized as enforceable contracts by the courts of Delaware and many other U.S. and
foreign jurisdictions, these 'corporate peace treaties' typically restrict the ability of shareholders or
potential acquirors to initiate hostile takeover bids or proxy contests for target companies . . .
4
See Sautter, supra note 1, at 968-69.
5
See Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling at 17-18, In re Complete Genomics,
Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edulfiles/bclbe/InReComplete Genomics.PDF (finding that the target
corporation's board impermissibly limited its ongoing statutory and fiduciary obligations by agreeing
to a "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" provision); Transcript of the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 19-21, In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del.
Ch. Dec. 17, 2012), availableat http://www.wlrk.com/docs/121712%20Ancestry/o20ruling.pdf
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face-encouraging robust ex ante participation in a formal auction by
neutralizing the chilling effect of potential future topping bids-it also seems
self-contradictory: If the formal auction is intended to maximize shareholder
value, why prevent subsequent bidders from making higher offers? If
standstills are used, they should encourage, not discourage, the highest
possible sale price.'
We suggest that the Nobel Prize-winning theory of mechanism design
holds the key to unlocking a new paradigm for structuring M&A auctions
that both promotes efficiency and maximizes shareholder value.' Traditional
auction theory has investigated the properties of standard auction procedures
but not generally proposed new procedures that balance the interests of
buyers and sellers.' In this Article, we rigorously apply the principles of
mechanism design to forge an auction process that makes participation and
honest disclosure of reservation prices in the parties' best interests.' We
show that it is even possible to neutralize the winner's curse while exploiting
uncertainty to yield a higher sales price than a second-price-and possibly
even a first-price-auction."o
In a prior article, we discussed the application of mechanism design to
the law generally, and bargaining in particular, and argued that algorithmic
procedures can "eliminate the incentive to engage in costly strategic
bargaining, reduce transaction costs, and thereby facilitate efficient trade.""
We focused on the application ofmechanism design to bilateral negotiations,
showing its potential with respect to settlement negotiations and disclosure
under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1' In this Article,

we extend these insights to the multilateral setting of M&A auctions to
demonstrate how incentive compatibility can promote efficiency and
maximize shareholder value in change-of-control transactions."
(finding that "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" clauses are not per se impermissible, but that they must be
disclosed to shareholders).
6See Telephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling at 18, In re Complete Genomics,
Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012); Sautter, supra note 1, at 933.
See Mechanism Design Theory Founders Win 2007Nobel Prize in Economics, SCIENCE
DAILY (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071016130150.htm (last
visited Aug. 3, 2013) ("[Mechanism design theory] has helped economists identify efficient trading
mechanisms, regulation schemes, and voting procedures.").
8
See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL: MERGERS AND ACQuIsiONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE
746-50 (2000) (discussing the classic two-step standard auction procedures).
9
See infra Part III.
'oSee infra Part III.
" Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Law andMechanism Design: Proceduresto Induce
Honest Bargaining, 68 ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 7), availableat
http://ssm.com/abstract-2161045.
2
1 See id (manuscript at 4).
"See infra Part III.
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This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, we provide an overview
of structuring M&A auctions and discuss the recent controversy in the
Delaware courts over DADW standstills." Part III introduces a novel twostage auction procedure that neutralizes the winner's curse and makes the
honest disclosure of reservation prices optimal while introducing beneficial
uncertainty that can yield an even higher sale price. We argue that our twostage procedure not only comports with a board's Revlon duties," but also
has substantial social benefits by promoting transparency, stability, and
fairness, entitling it to favorable treatment by the Delaware courts." Finally,
we conclude this Article in Part IV."
II. M&A AUCTIONS AND DELAWARE CASE LAW
A. StructuringM&A Auctions: Bidding Procedures,Confidentiality
Agreements, andStandstills
Once a company has decided to put itself up for sale, it has a variety
of means by which to structure the sale process." As these have been
discussed extensively elsewhere,20 in this Section we provide a brief
overview of the essential issues. In general, boards of directors of target
companies face a fundamental challenge between maximizing the sale price
and ensuring that the transaction is, in fact, consummated.2 ' While this
tension is present with any sale of goods, it is particularly heightened in the
market for corporate control because the sheer size and complexity of these
transactions substantially raise the stakes of failure.22
A firm that puts itself up for sale but is unable to obtain a suitor is
likely to be viewed as "damaged goods."23 Potential buyers will conclude
that the parties previously interested in acquiring the firm (who received

infra Part II.
"See infra Part 1H.
' 6See Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 519, 523
14See

(2008-2009) (discussing the two elements of the Revlon doctrine).
"See infra Part II.C.
"See infra Part IV.
"See Christina M. Sautter, Auction Theory andStandstills: Dealingwith FriendsandFoes
in a Sale of Corporate Control (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 24-33), available at

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=2207693.
20
See generally id. (discussing the various structural issues involved in a sale of corporate
control in depth, as well as the relevant auction theory literature and recent cases).
21See Sautter, supra note 1, at 932-33.
22
See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 8, at 750.
23
See Sautter, supra note 19 (manuscript at 30).
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confidential information regarding its financial and business prospects as a
result) must have discovered something unacceptable.24 Because of
confidentiality agreements, other potential buyers are often unable to identify
the cause of failed negotiations and will withdraw from the process out of
sheer risk-aversion. 25 This is very different from the typical sale of goods in
"thick" competitive markets, wherein an abundance of buyers and sellers
often leads to a settlement at a competitive price in equilibrium. 26
At the same time, despite the damaged-goods risk, target companies
cannot simply prize certainty above all else and take the first offer they
receive. Under the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,27 the board of directors of a target
company is specially obligated, in the event of a sale of control, "to seek the
transaction offering the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders." 28 This principle not only precludes ignoring the potential for a
higher-priced offer, but it also prohibits taking into account any other
consideration such as those related to bondholders, employees, or the
company's long-term business prospects.2 ' However, when evaluating an
offer, the board of directors may consider not only the deal price but also
other aspects relevant to the likelihood of consummation of the transaction,
such as financing certainty and antitrust or other regulatory approvals."o
To ensure that a sale withstands judicial scrutiny in subsequent
shareholder litigation, boards often adopt structured bidding procedures
intended to obtain the highest price among bidders that are similarly
qualified with respect to deal certainty." These procedures frequently

24See WASSERSTEIN, supra note

8, at 750.
See Sautter, supra note 19 (manuscript at 30-31).

25

26
Cf IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 20 (2005)
(quoting Carol M. Rose, The Shadow ofThe Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2183 (1997) ("Ayres

and Talley are interested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other, thin markets
instead of'thick' ones.")).
27
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
28
Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993) (citing
Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1285 n.35 (Del. 1989)); Revlon, 506 A.2d
at 173). See generally Furlow, supra note 16, at 519-21.
29

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (emphasizing that once "it became apparent to all that the

break-up of the company was inevitable ... [t]he directors' role changed from defenders of the
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a sale of
the company .... [C]oncern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among
active bidders is in progress, and the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate
enterprise but to sell it to the highest bidder.").
3oSee In re Topps Co. S'holders Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 72-73 (Del. Ch. 2007) (permitting a

target board to take into account factors such as ability to obtain financing, risk of antitrust delay,
and proposed reverse termination fees).
31
See Sautter, supra note 1, at 27-28 (citing WASSERSTEIN, supra note 8, at 746-47)
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include several rounds of letters of intent and due diligence, but eventually a
handful of serious bidders submit final offers at specific prices-e.g., $40
per share. 32 While these offers may vary slightly with respect to non-price
terms-e.g., consideration in the form of cash vs. stock of the acquiring firm,
or the extent of required regulatory approval-the primary competition at the
final stage is on the price." As the board is obligated under Revlon to take
the highest price among otherwise equally qualified bidders, even a
difference of $0.50/share could make the difference between winning and
losing the auction.34
Moreover, even if the board announces an agreement with a winning
bidder at the highest price among participants in the auction, the transaction
is always vulnerable to subsequent interlopers who might make a topping
bid." The board's duty to maximize the sale price compels it to consider any
offer received prior to closing the transaction, even one made by a third party
subsequent to the board's agreement with the winning party." This means
that, in principle, a bidding war is always possible-an interloper need only
wait until a transaction is announced in order to free ride on the due
diligence and associated costs that have been already incurred by the
winning bidder." While a true bidding war could lead to a higher sale price
for the target firm, the ex ante risk that a winning bidder might lose to a freeriding interloper will deter many potential bidders from participating if the
probability of losing to an interloper is sufficiently high."
Accordingly, target companies utilize various mechanisms to achieve
the twin goals of: (i) robust participation in the auction and (ii) attainment of
the highest possible price for the company." One mechanism is the
(describing typical bidding procedures).
32

See id

33

auction.

WASSERSTEIN, supra

note 8, at 747 ("Price often is the determining factor in an

34

See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. See, e.g., Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d
1261, 1286-88 (Del. 1989) (invalidating a lock-up agreement because it effectively ended an auction
in which a higher bid could have been obtained).
35
See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) (prohibiting a
target firm's board of directors from refusing to consider future bids that might be superior offers).
36
d.
"See id.

"One might observe this dynamic and conclude that because the potential for topping bids
renders the auction procedure inherently unstable, it is unclear why the structured process has not
already been replaced by a free-for-all procedure. As we explain, firms use confidentiality
agreements and standstills to attempt to lock in potential bidders to the auction procedure. See
Sautter, supra note 1, at 943. However, that does not imply that the use of a sealed-bid or open
ascending auction is optimal. While accepting the need to constrain bidders to an explicit auction
we offer what we believe is a superior alternative to these standard procedures.
procedure,
39
1d
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confidentiality agreement, particularly when combined with a standstill
provision.40 Such agreements prohibit potential bidders not only from
disclosing nonpublic information they receive but also from making any bid
for the company outside of the formal auction procedure. 4 1 Target firms
routinely demand such agreements as a prerequisite to participating in the
auction, 42 ensuring that, at the very least, none of the auction participants can
suddenly reappear as an interloper.43
Another means by which target companies attempt to protect against
interlopers who did not participate in the original auction is by granting the
winning bidder a matching right in the purchase agreement." This confers
upon the winning bidder of the formal auction the "explicit right[]" to match
any subsequent topping bid.45 While this might seem to deter interlopers by
preventing their topping bids from succeeding, an interloper can always top
this matching bid, depriving the match right of its force. 6 The potential for a
bidding war remains unless interlopers are restricted-say, to one topping
bid, which then can be matched. 47 However, such a restriction is arbitrary,
which is likely to prevent a company from realizing its full value in a sale.48
Even if deal-protection mechanisms are effective at deterring
interlopers, their fundamental tension with maximizing the sale price
remains.49 It might be true that preventing topping bids, or restricting their
number, benefits shareholders by encouraging participation in an auction,
which leads to a higher price than one in which only a few bidders
participate.o However, denying a firm the opportunity to consider a concrete

40

1d
4'See In re Celera Corp. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 6304 VCP, Op. at 53 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23,

2012); see also Sautter, supra note 1,at 932, 945-46.
42See Sautter,supra note 1, at 945 ("No matter the form in which they appear, standstills are
de rigueur.").
43See

id. at 946.

44See generally Brian JM Quinn, Re-Evaluating the Emerging Standardof Review for
Matching Rights in Control Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 1011 (2011) (providing a

comprehensive overview of matching rights and advocating a stricter standard of review).
45
1d. at 1015.
46
But see id.at 1022 ("By maintaining the exclusivity of the relationship between the rightholder and the seller, the matching rights raise the probability that the right-holder's bid will
succeed.").
47
See id.
48
The general standard for evaluating deal-protection devices is found in Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), which prohibits coercive mechanisms that are
disproportionate to the threat posed. See Sautter,supra note 1,at 955-56 (discussing the invalidity
of an offer made to acquire a corporation in violation of a contractually agreed upon standstill
provision).
9
4 See Quinn, supra note 44, at 1020.
s"See id at 1020-22.
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offer at a significantly higher price makes these mechanisms difficult to
reconcile with a board of director's duty to maximize the sale price for
shareholders."
The ad hoc nature of standstills suggests that they are crude and
overbearing-it is difficult to determine whether a standstill is truly creating
value for shareholders by maximizing the sale price, or simply protecting
favored bidders from future competition." Indeed, target firms have lately
become even more aggressive in their efforts to clamp down on interlopers,
as evidenced by the recent controversy over DADW standstills."
B. Recent Controversy over "Don'tAsk, Don't Waive" Standstills
A DADW standstill is a particularly aggressive form of protecting the
winning bidder in a formal auction.54 The standstill consists of two
components: a provision in confidentiality agreements made with potential
bidders prohibiting them from requesting a waiver of the standstill to pursue
an offer outside the formal bidding procedure, and a prohibition on waiving
the standstill, which applies to the target firm in its purchase agreement with
the winning bidder." The former's purpose is to protect a target firm's board
of directors from having to consider a request to waive the standstill, which
may signal that the bidder is prepared to make a topping bid. 6 By
prohibiting even a request to waive the prohibition on making the higherpriced offer, the target firm can claim to its shareholders that it never had the
opportunity to consider allowing a topping bid from this bidder." In
addition, by committing to the winning bidder that it will not waive the
standstill, the target firm's board may claim that it is contractually bound not
to consider any offer made by a firm subject to a standstill-while

51

See Sautter, supra note 1, at 932-33.

52
See
5

id.

There have been numerous recent Supreme Court of Delaware and Delaware
Court of Chancery cases involving non-disclosure. See Kaye Scholer, Don'task,
don't
waive

after

Ancestry.com,

LEXOLOGY

(Feb.

14,

2013),

http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-f640c949-cal 5-4c2c-938a-affccfe5795a.
54
See Sautter, supra note 1, at 74.
55

are

See Delaware Court of Chancery Holds that "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" Provisions
Permissible Under Certain Circumstances, PAUL WEISs (Jan. 4, 2013),

http://www.paulweiss.com/practices/transactional/mergers-acquisitions/publications/delaware-courtof-chancery-holds-that-"don't-ask,-don't-waive"-provisions-are-permissible-under-certaincircumstances.aspx?id=1 1998.
56
See Sautter, supra note 1, at 968-70.
s"See id.
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ameliorating fiduciary concerns by leaving open the possibility of external
interloper offers."
Naturally, the use of DADW standstills has led to litigation in the
Delaware Court of Chancery." In a November 2012 hearing in the case of
In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, Vice Chancellor
Laster struck down a DADW standstill, holding that:
[A] Don't Ask, Don't Waive Standstill is impermissible because
it has the same disabling effect as the no-talk clause, although
on a bidder-specific basis. By agreeing to this provision, the
Genomics board impermissibly limited its ongoing statutory
and fiduciary obligations to properly evaluate a competing
offer, disclose material information, and make a meaningful
merger recommendation to its stockholders."o
Genomics involved a topping bid from an external bidder at 5 percent above
the winning bid at the formal auction, which the Board rejected due to
antitrust concerns." However, Vice Chancellor Laster emphasized that the
rationale for his decision derived from the ex ante chilling effect of a DADW
standstill, regardless of whether a topping bid was actually made.62 Vice
Chancellor Laster's decision sparked concern among M&A lawyers
representing target firms who claimed that it is difficult to force bidders to
participate in the formal auction without a DADW provision."
Shortly thereafter, Chancellor Strine weighed in on the validity of a
DADW standstill in the case of In re Ancestry.com Shareholders
64
Litigation.
While the dispute in Ancestry.com did not concern the

5See id. at 968 ("A particularly sensitive question with respect to standstills is when a board
of directors may legitimately promise not to waive the standstill provision.").
59

See Steven M. Davidoff, A Technical Debate With Broader Implicationsfor Deal-

Making, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Jan. 25, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/atechnical-debate-with-broader-implications-for-deal-making/; see also Sautter, supranote 1,at 4857.
6oTelephonic Oral Argument and the Court's Ruling at 18, In re Complete Genomics, Inc.
S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7888-VCL (Del. Ch. Nov. 27, 2012) available at
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/In_re Complete GenomicsSholder Litigation CANo_7888VCL_%28Del
ChNov272012%29%2800232324%29.PDF.
61
Id at 13-14.
62
Id. at 13, 18.
See, e.g., William Savitt, Don't Ask, Don't Waive Standstills, The Harvard Law School
Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, HARVARD LAW (Dec. 18, 2012),

http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/12/18/dont-ask-dont-waive-standstills/.

"Transcript of the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, In re
Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012), available at

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

882

[Vol. 38

application of the DADW standstill, Strine noted that the DADW standstill
is a "pretty potent provision," and "directors need to use these things
consistently with their fiduciary duties, and they better be dam careful about
them."" However, Strine emphasized that he was "not prepared to rule out
that they can't be used for value-maximizing purposes." 6 He continued,
explaining that:
the value-maximizing purpose has to be to allow the seller as a
well-motivated seller to use it as a gavel, to impress upon the
people that it has brought into the process the fact that the
process is meaningful; that if you're creating an auction, there is
really an end to the auction for those who participate. And
therefore, you should bid your fullest because if you win, you
have the confidence of knowing you actually won that auction
at least against the other people in the process.
The board of Ancestry.com had waived the standstill, but Strine concluded
that if it had not, the DADW provision would not have been used for a
value-maximizing purpose under the facts of Ancestry. com."
These narrow and somewhat contradictory holdings illustrate the
challenge with the current approach to protecting the bidding process." The
ad hoc use of blunt instruments such as DADW standstills renders the injury
to shareholders very salient, but the hypothetical benefits of increased
auction participation quite distant.o Shareholders must believe that the oneshot sealed bid nature of the formal auction maximizes value. However, as
we explain in Part III, auction theory suggests that this is not the case." As

http://www.wlrk.com/docs/121712%20Ancestry/20ruling.pdf.
at 22.
"Id.
66

1d. at 23.
Id.
68
Transcript of the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 24-25,
In re Ancestry.com Inc. S'holder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012), available at
http://www.wlrk.com/does/121712%20Ancestry/o2Oruling.pdf.
69
See Transcript of the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, In re
Ancestry.com Inc. Sholder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012),
availableat
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/121712%2OAncestry%20ruling.pdf; Telephonic Oral Argument and the
Courts Ruling, In re Complete Genomics, Inc. Sholder Litig.,
C.A. No. 7888-VCL
(Del.
Ch.
Nov.
27,
2012)
available
at
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/InreComplete Genomics SholderLitigation CANo 7888VCL_%28Del Ch Nov272012%29%2800232324%29.PDF.
70
See Sautter, supra note 19 (manuscript at 68-69) (discussing the economic incentives of
standstill provisions).
7
'See infra Part II.
67
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in any negotiation under incomplete information, potential purchasers have
an incentive to "shade their bids" to avoid the winner's curse.7 2
The presence of asymmetric information, however, often renders such
shading suboptimal, causing bids to be lower than would otherwise be the
case." Indeed, the very emergence of an interloper suggests that the formal
auction process did not yield the optimal (i.e., maximum) purchase price. In
the following Part, we propose a new procedure based on mechanism
design-a two-stage auction-which removes the incentive to shade bids
and possibly yields a higher settlement price than a sealed-bid auction, all
without subjecting bidders to the winner's curse."
III. MECHANISM DESIGN IN M&A AUCTIONS: A Two-STAGE AUCTION
PROCEDURE

A. Auction Theory and Mechanism Design in M&A Auctions
Several scholars have applied auction theory to mergers and
acquisitions." Much of the analysis has focused on the distinction between
private and common valuation of the target firm."6 Summarizing this
literature, Christina Sautter recently concluded that the debate over private
vs. common valuation is largely misplaced because "[a]ctual bidders rarely
have identical valuations for an auctioned object nor are their valuations
completely uncorrelated."" Sautter concludes that this mix of private and

72

See Susan Athey, Jonathan Levin, & Enrique Seira, Comparing Open and Sealed Bid
Auctions: Evidence From Timber Auctions, 126 Q. J. ECON. 207, 208-09 (2011) ("But in a sealed
bid auction, strong bidders have greater incentive to shade their bids below their true valuations, so a
weak bidder may win despite not having the highest valuation.").
73
See Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An EmpiricalStudy of an Auction with
Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865, 881-82 (1988) (suggesting that firms with an
informational advantage exploit their advantage by shading their bids substantially below their
private valuation).
74See infra Part m.
7See
Peter Cramton & Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover
Regulation, 7 J.L. ECON & ORG. 27, 27 (1991) (focusing on how Delaware courts prefer utilizing
auctions to maximize value in the sales of corporate assets); Alexander S. Gorbenko & Andrey
Malenko, Strategic and FinancialBidders in Takeover Auctions, J. FIN. (forthcoming 2013)

(evaluating auction theory and bidder strategies in M&A context); see also Sautter, supranote 19
(manuscript
at 2).
76
See, e.g., Gorbenko & Malenko, supra note 75 (manuscript at 3-4); Sautter, supranote 19
(manuscript at 18) ("[M]ost existing auction literature only allows for the case of either private value
or common value bidding environments . . . .").
77

29).

Sautter, supra note 19 (manuscript at 15) (citing Cramton & Schwartz, supranote 75, at
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common valuations is unlikely to permit deducing an optimal M&A auction
procedure because of the complexity of change-of-control transactions."
By contrast, we suggest that by shifting the focus from the analysis of
standard auction procedures to the design of new procedures, mechanism
design theory can provide innovative and compelling alternatives. As we
explained in a recent piece on mechanism design in the law, mechanism
design "is 'the art of designing the rules of the game (aka. mechanism) so
that a desirable outcome (according to a given objective) is reached despite
the fact that each agent acts in his own self-interest.""' Indeed, the 2007
Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded for the development of mechanism
design and the principle of incentive-compatibility, whereby parties are
induced to report their reservation prices, or "bottom lines."" In auctions,
this motivates parties to be truthful by rendering their bidding behavior
compatible with their sincere economic interests."
In our prior piece, we proposed two mechanisms that reduce
transaction costs in the bilateral-negotiation setting: the "Bonus Procedure"
and "Two-Stage Procedure."" Each gives the parties incentives to honestly
disclose their reservation prices." Here we argue that a novel auction
procedure can do something analogous: structure bidding incentives to make
the parties more forthcoming, reducing if not eliminating the strategizing,
and concomitant inefficiencies, of standard procedures.
As we noted in our previous piece, there are several sources of
inefficiency in the conduct of M&A auctions today.84 In a sealed-bid
auction, the winning bidder is subject to the winner's curse, i.e., the risk of
overpayment beyond the actual value of the firm." This is especially acute
when the winning bid substantially exceeds the second-highest bid, causing
the winner to pay considerably more than he needed to in order to acquire a

7

Id at 17-18.

79

Brams & Mitts, supra note 11 (manuscript at 12) (quoting Tuomas Sandholm, Automated

Mechanism Design:A New ApplicationAreafor SearchAlgorithms, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
OF CONSTRAINT PROGRAMMING - CP 2003 19 (Francesca Rossi, ed., 2003)).
soSee The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, The Prize in Economic Sciences 2007,
(2007), available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicPRIZE
NOBEL

sciences/laureates/2007/popular-economicsciences2007.pdf.
81
See Brams & Mitts, supra note 11 (manuscript at 21) (proposing that a two-stage
procedure utilizing mechanism design will induce parties to report their reservation prices and
provide an incentive for parties to act honestly).
82
See id. (manuscript at 16).
83

See id

84

See Brams & Mitts, supra note 11 (manuscript at 8-11).

85

See STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DivISION: FROM CAKE-CUTTING TO
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 247 (Cambridge University Press 1996) ("A winner's curse in an auction

occurs when the winner, by virtue of winning, ends up overpaying and, in this sense, 'losing."').
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firm." If a topping bidder can jump in before the sale is final, it can avoid
the winner's curse by bidding the smallest acceptable amount that exceeds
the winner's bid." Assuming that the participants in the regular auction
know this can happen, they have little reason to participate and bid honestly
in it.

In an open, ascending auction, there is no winner's curse because the
bidders always know the present highest bid." However, in these auctions,
there is no incentive to be honest, as it is always better to pay less than one
thinks the company is worth, knowing that later one can raise one's bid if
necessary." On the other hand, if more than one bidder is determined to
win, the resulting competition can set off frenzied bidding." This has the
same effect as the winner's curse, whereby emerging as the winner may
cause one to regret one's success."
Uncertainty about the behavior of other bidders compounds the
difficulties of bidding in sealed-bid auctions.92 To see how this can occur,
consider a hypothetical sealed-bid auction where bidder A's reservation price
is $50/share and bidder B's is $40/share." Assuming an element of common
value-i.e., that A's reservation price is related but not identical to B's-it is
plainly irrational for A to bid $50/share and realize no profit. If A had
complete information-i.e., if it knew B's reservation price-it could avoid
overpaying (the winner's curse) by bidding some small positive amount ?'
86

See id at 182.

'Naive and inexperienced bidders are especially susceptible to the winner's curse. See
George Deltas & Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Naive Bidding, 51 MGMT. Sci. 328, 328, 333
(2005).
88

See R. Preston McAfee & John McMillan, Auctions and Bidding, 25 J. ECON.

LITERATURE 699, 722 (1987).
s9See id at 707-08.
90

See id at 707 n.9 ("[T]he excitement generated by open calling of bids in an English
auction can cause bidders to bid too high.").
91

See, e.g., Jill R. Aitoro, Buyer's Remorse?, WASH. BUS. J. (Mar, 1 2013),

http://www.bizjoumals.con/washington/print-edition/2013/03/01/buyers-remorse.html?page=all
(emphasizing the importance of a company creating a clear strategy and abiding by it); Brenon Daly,
A Severe Case of Buyer's Remorse for SAP, THE 451 GROuP

(Nov. 24,

2010),

http://blogs.the451group.com/techdeals/application-software/a-severe-case-of-buyers-remorse-forsap/ (noting implications regarding SAP purchases and lawsuits); Tom Groenfeldt, HP and
Autonomy

--

Buyer's

Remorse,

or

Worse?,

FORBES

(Nov.

20,

2012),

http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomgroenfeldt/2012/l1/20/hp-and-autonomy-buyers-remorse-or-worse/
(discussing whether HP's acquisition of Autonomy was made at too costly a price).
92See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 180.
93
See also Tuo Wang R. Venkatesh & Rabikar Chatterjee, Reservation Priceas a Range:
An Incentive-Compatible Measurement Approach, 44 J. MKTG. RES. 200, 200-01 (2007)

(discussing
the term "reservation price" and its multiple definitions).
94
The Greek letter epsilon is sometimes used to signify a random error term in statistics, but
here it indicates an arbitrarily small increment to the figure that precedes it.
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just over $40/share. 5 But if A has incomplete information-i.e., if it does
not know B's reservation price with certainty (which is always the case in the
real world) but knows only its probability distribution-it will have to
ascribe some probability to the different reservation prices B might have."
Then it could place a bid at the expected value of B's reservation price plus
E. For example, assume that A estimates the probability distribution of B's
reservation price as follows:
Figure 1
Reservation Price

Probability

$30

10%

$35

15%

$40

20%

$45

40%

$50

15%

The expected value of B's reservation price is $41.75." It would seem
that A should bid slightly more-say, $42-though a case can be made for A
to bid $45 + E(see next paragraph). But the key point is that regardless of
whether A has complete or incomplete information, it is never rational for it
to bid $50 and realize no profit."
Clearly, parties always have an incentive to bid less than their
reservation prices to try to avoid the winner's curse, especially if they believe

95
See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 88, at 705 (explaining that learning an opponent's
valuation provides helpful information regarding the real value).
96

See Wonseok Oh, C2C Versus B2C: A Comparisonofthe Winner's Curse in Two Types

ofElectronic Auctions, 6 INT'L J.ELEC. COM. 115, 118 (2002) ("Obviously, valuations of a given
product may diverge considerably depending on how extensively the bidders have searched."). .
97
The calculation is as follows: $30(0.10) + $35(0.15) + $40(0.20) + $45(0.40) + $50(0.15)
= $41.75.
9

8See also Deltas & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, supra note 87, at 329 (discussing how irrational
bidding also results from miscalculations, extreme overconfidence, and lack of insight into the
motives of other bidders).
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they may be the highest bidder and, therefore, may win." However, bidding
$42 is no panacea for A, because 40% + 15% = 55% of the time its bid will
be too low (i.e., below $45), and B will win.'" If A's primary goal is to win,
and with some profit, it would be preferable for it to bid $45 + e and win
85% of the time, losing only when B bids $50."o' Manifestly, the goals of
bidders, as well as the auction rules themselves, matter in det irmining
bidding strategies, as we indicated earlier in describing the frenzy of bidding
that sometimes occurs in open, ascending auctions, often to the detriment of
the winning bidder.02
Is there a procedure that induces honest bidding (bidding one's
reservation price), protects against the winner's curse, and affords a bidder an
expected profit? If so, this would be a substantial improvement over extant
auction procedures.' 3 As we show in the following Subsection, our twostage procedure'" does just that, while also making it possible for the firm to
receive a higher settlement price than standard auction procedures
produce.'
Interestingly, little literature has considered whether different types of
procedures can bring improvements over the status quo in M&A auctions.
Paul Povel and Rajdeep Singh advocate a sequential selling procedure,
whereby the seller does not begin an auction with competitive bidding until
after first offering exclusive deals to each bidder in sequential order.0 6 They
argue that their procedure is optimal under certain assumptions, particularly
that the "the target commits not to change the rules of the sequential
procedure once it has started[,]" and that no outside bidder may top the
exclusive deal reached in the first stage.'
In our view, Povel and Singh's procedure is both unrealistic and
fundamentally contrary to a board's fiduciary duty under Revlon. As a
practical matter, it seems unlikely that target firms would be willing to
consider only single bids in sequential, exclusive negotiations. From a legal
standpoint, a commitment to refuse to consider any bids for the company
other than the current bidder in the sequence seems antithetical to the

"See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 247.
'ooSee Figure 1.
101M

102See supra note 38 and accompanying text.

103See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 179.
1041I referring to "our procedure," the Authors mean its adaption to M&A auctions,
not the
model developed by authors BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85.
05
See infra Part U.B.
06
Paul Povel & Rajdeep Singh, Takeover Contests with Asymmetric Bidders, 19REV. FIN.
STUD. 1399, 1409 (2006).
1o'd at 1415.

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

888

[Vol. 38

principle of competition and value maximization for shareholders.'s
Negotiating exclusive deals would almost certainly violate a board's Revlon
duty to maximize shareholder value, which has been interpreted as requiring
the consideration of topping bids even after a merger agreement is signed.'o
Indeed, when discussing Povel and Singh's sequential approach,
Christina Sautter contends that "commitment to the rules in a M&A sales
process may be too much to hope for.""0 We beg to differ; there is a welldesigned auction procedure that can bring substantial benefits to all the
parties.
How is this possible? As we will show shortly, our auction procedure,
which is pro-competitive, fair, and open to all interested bidders, satisfies
Revlon by obtaining the highest price reasonably attainable under the
circumstances."' It does not foreclose any competition through a series of
exclusive negotiations, making it value-maximizing. In the following
Section, we describe this procedure in detail, demonstrating the compelling
advantages it offers over the status quo." 2
B. A Two-Stage Auction Procedure
1. Brief Description of the Procedure
We propose an auction procedure consisting of two stages." 3 As we
noted previously, this procedure is most useful when the initial screening has
been conducted, and non-price terms have been largely standardized, such
that the primary competition is over price."4 Accordingly, this procedure
could usefully be employed, after negotiations on non-price terms have been
concluded, as a mechanism for selecting the winning bidder."'

08

See Furlow,supra note 16, at 523.
' 09See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914, 938 (Del. 2003) ("[T]he NCS

board was required to negotiate a fiduciary out clause to protect the NCS stockholders if the Genesis
transaction became an inferior offer. By acceding to Genesis's ultimatum for
complete protection in futuro, the NCS board disabled itself from exercising its own fiduciary
obligations. . . .").
1oSautter, supra note 19 (manuscript at 18).
"See Furlow,supra note 16, at 523.
"l2See infra Part UH.B.
" 3 Portions of the two-stage auction procedure are derived from an earlier work by one of
the Authors on fair division by auctions. See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 178-203.
"l4 See WASSERSTEIN, supra note 8, at 747 ("Price often is the determining factor in an
auction; but other issues sometimes make a critical difference."). We discuss how differing nonprice terms affect our analysis below.
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In stage I, the interested buyers independently submit bids to the
company."' Note that it is not necessary for a human being to manage the
bidding process; it could be handled entirely by a third-party referee, or even
a computer program operated by the target company or an external
regulator."' The submission of bids in the first stage must be effectively
simultaneous-prior to some deadline-and no party's bid would be revealed
to any other party until all bids are received."' Upon conclusion of the first
stage, the bid amounts would be disclosed to all parties, including the target
company, but the identity of the bidders need not be if some bidders prefer
their identity be kept confidential."'
In stage II, each bidder independently chooses either to affirm its
existing bid or "usurp" another bidder.'20 Usurpingmeans that, instead of
repeating (i.e., affirming) its stage I bid, a bidder chooses the bid of another
participant, which may be either higher or lower than its own bid."' If
lower, a bidder may effectively "bail out," or withdraw from the auction at
this stage, by usurping the very lowest bid.'22 At the conclusion of stage II,
the highest bidder wins the auction.'23 If two or more bidders affirm or usurp
the highest bid, the highest bidder in stage I breaks the tie and wins the
auction.'24
In the following Subsection, we show that with two intuitive
assumptions-the Judicial Bidding Assumption and the Competitiveness
Assumption-this simple procedure induces honest bidding in stage I, i.e.,
bids which reflect the parties' reservation prices, thereby removing the
incentive for suboptimal bidding.1' At stage II, the participants choose
strategies that, in general, yield a higher settlement price for the target firm
than procedures that do not encourage honest bidding.'26
But before offering details on optimal bidding strategies, it is worth
pointing out two features that we recommend the two-stage procedure
include. First, the initial choice to utilize the procedure by a company
should not irrevocably bind the company to a transaction. Before the

"6BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181.

"7 See, e.g., Auction Software for Live & Internet Auctions, AuCTION FLEX,
http://www.auctionflex.com (last visited Sept. 5, 2009).
8
See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181.
"9See id at 179, 181.

at 181.
121See id at 178, 182.
120

122BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85,
12
at 181.

at 183.

1241d

12'Id at 181, 183-84.
126See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 191-196.
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bidding begins, the company would be permitted to indicate a secret reserve
price, below which it will not sell.'27 If all the bids are below this price in
stage I, the company could terminate the procedure at this stage."' But the
company could also wait until stage II, when both the winning bid and the
identity of the winning bidder are known.'29
The reserve price would not be binding on the company.'30 For
example, if the company were pleased with the winning bidder even though
it thought its bid was too low, it would not be forced to back out.' 3 ' The
company might realize that, after seeing all the bids, it will not be able to do
better.'32 That said, if the reserve price is met, the company would be bound
by the procedure. '3 We return to this point in Section III.C., when we
discuss legal treatment of the two-stage auction mechanism.1'
Second, non-price terms could be incorporated into the procedure. All
that would be required is a simple conversion of non-price terms to price
amounts. This could be done, for example, by empirically comparing prior
transactions at similar prices that varied on non-price terms to estimate an
approximate value for each non-price term. Companies might also be
permitted to set a specific value for each non-price term, which could be
conveyed to the parties in advance of using the procedure so they would
know that the company's valuation of a certain non-price term should be
incorporated into their bids.13
2. Inducing Honesty in Bidding: Sincere Bids3 6
In a review article on auctions, McAfee and McMillan remark that
"[t]he essence of the auction problem is the unobservability of bidders'

'27See McAfee & McMillan, supra note 88, at 702 (explaining that variations of the basic
auction forms include auctions where the seller may impose a reserve price, and discard all bids if
they are below that price).
128See RALPH CASSADY JR., AUCTIONS AND AUCTIONEERING 57, 227 (1967).
129See id. at 227.
'See id. at 226-27 ("A seller establishes a reserve price in order to avoid 'giving an item
away in a temporary soft-market situation.").
'See id at 226-28.
'See infra Part Ill.C.
33
1 See infra Part ff.C.
134See infra Part ffl.C.
'See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluatingthe Selection ofClass

Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 650, 688 (2002) (illustrating how the Department of
Defense converts various non-price factors of bids into objective scores).
36
' This Section is taken nearly verbatim from BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181-98.
All additional propositions are cited specifically in this Section.
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The two-stage procedure-whose rules we recapitulate
valuations.'".
below-is designed to ameliorate this problem by making the bids in the first
stage common knowledge in the second stage:
Stage I. The parties submit sealed bids, all of which are
The parties have no prior
opened and made public.
information about each other's sealed bids or valuations.
Stage I. Each party chooses exactly one of the stage I bids by
affirming its own bid or by usurping another player's bid.
Payoffs. If there is only one party that makes the highest bid in
stage II, that party wins the auction, regardless what it bid in
stage I. If there is more than one party that makes the highest
bid in stage II, the party that made the highest bid in stage I
wins the auction.
In terms of the information they provide, these rules give two-stage
auctions elements of both an English auction, in which bids are oral, open,
and ascending, and a sealed-bid auction. Unlike an English auction, bids are
revealed all at once (in stage II), not sequentially; but like an English
auction, bids can be revised. Unlike a sealed-bid auction, the initial bids are
not decisive; but like a sealed-bid auction, they are made simultaneously,
albeit in two different stages.
Define a sincere bid as one in which a party bids its estimate of the
true worth of a company, or its valuation, in stage I, making it indifferent
between winning at that bid and losing the auction. Under plausible
conditions, it is rational for the parties to bid sincerely in stage I.
Consider first the case ofa private-valueauction, wherein valuations
are strictly the parties' own and are unaffected by knowledge of other parties'
valuations or bids. To derive optimal bidding strategies in such an auction,
we make two assumptions:
1. Judicious-BiddingAssumption (JBA). A party will never make a
stage I bid, or choose a stage II option, such that, if it wins the auction, it
might suffer a loss.
2. CompetitivenessAssumption (CA). A party will choose a strategy,
comprising a stage I bid and a stage II option, by successively eliminating
dominated strategies.

1"McAfee & McMillan, supra note 88, at 711.
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JBA implies that parties do not take risks, given their private
valuations. CA says that, in the absence of having a dominant strategy,
which is at least as good and sometimes better than any other strategy a party
might choose, the parties successively narrow down the their possible
choices by ruling out strategies that are definitely inferior. CA may be
replaced by a No-Regret Assumption (NRA), which says that a party will
never make a stage I bid, or choose a stage II option, such that it should turn
out to be the party with the highest valuation, it might lose the auction.
Given JBA and CA (or NRA), we can state the following theorem.
Theorem. Consider a two-stage, private-value auction with
multiple parties. Assume the following are true and common
knowledge:
(i) Different parties never have equal valuations and never
make equal bids in stage I.
(ii) All reservation prices are in the interval [0,1], and the value
of [1] is common knowledge.
(iii) JBA, CA (or NRA), and that they are common
knowledge.
Then iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies leads all
parties to bid their valuations in stage .' In stage II,the highest bidder will
usurp the second-highest bid, and thereby win the auction at a price lower
that its valuation (and thereby ensure itself of a profit). The other bidders
will affirm their bids.
Intuitively, no bidder will usurp a higher stage I bid in a private-value
auction, because it will suffer a loss if it wins. Given that this will not
happen according to JBA, the highest bidder can rest assured that it will not
only win but also profit from usurping the second-highest bid, so it has no
reason to confirm its highest bid and only break even.
Knowing this, the other bidders, anticipating that they will lose, can
do no worse than confirm their bids. In the unlikely event that one wins, its
payoff will be the same (zero) as if it lost. Carrying this reasoning back to
stage I, the parties should make sincere bids, because if a party's bid (and

38
I we replace CA with NRA, which is a slightly stronger assumption, then the Theorem
1f
follows immediately (i.e., without the need for "iterative elimination"). See BRAMs & TAYLOR,
supra note 85, at 185-186.
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valuation) is the highest, it will profit, whereas if it bid lower than its
valuation, another party might bid higher and win.
This outcome of a two-stage private-value auction is identical to that
of a one-stage Vickrey second-price auction, which is a sealed-bid auction in
which the party that makes the highest bid wins but pays only the secondhighest bid. Unlike a Vickrey auction, however, the outcome in a two-stage
auction, or Vickrey outcome, is not the product of dominant strategy choices
by the parties. Rather, it is based on the parties' successive elimination of
dominatedstrategies, which are inferior to other strategies of the parties.
While two-stage auctions implement the Vickrey outcome, they do so
in a way that obviates certain practical problems of Vickrey auctions, which
have inhibited their adoption."' Thus, by allowing the highest stage I bidder
in a two-stage auction to learn the second-highest bid in stage II, this bidder
is able to choose whether to usurp it or not, whereas in a Vickrey auction the
highest stage I bidder must pay the second-highest bid. Two-stage auctions
also provide a public means for the elimination of cheating or fraud in a
Vickrey auction. Fraud can occur in a Vickrey auction if bogus bids are
surreptitiously introduced by confederates in order to increase the amount
that the highest bidder must pay when it usurps the second-highest bid.
Even without bogus bids, the winner in a Vickrey auction may end up
paying almost what it bid, giving it only a minimal profit. By contrast, in a
two-stage auction, unless everyone else bids only slightly less than the
highest stage I bid, the highest bidder can effectively "bail out" by usurping
the lowest bid. The ability of the parties to "correct" their bids in stage II
attenuates the winner's curse.
We believe that two-stage auctions offer a persuasive and sensible
alternative not only to second-price Vickrey auctions but also to other kinds
of auctions that have been proposed or used. By making the stage I bids
common knowledge in stage II, they alleviate the "unobservability-ofbidders'-valuations" problem alluded to earlier. In the process, they enable
bidders to reduce uncertainty and thereby make more informed and, hence,
intelligent choices in stage II, when their choices count.
This is even truer in common-value auctions, in which everyone has
the same valuation of an item (e.g., based on the price it commands in the
market place), but about which they may have incomplete information. In a
two-stage auction, parties are able to discover in stage II that they may have
overbid (or underbid) in stage I.

1See Michael H. Rothkopf, Thomas J. Teisberg & Edward P. Kahn, Why Are Vickrey
Auctions Rare? 98 J.POL. ECON. 94, 96 (1990) (highlighting possible reasons why Vickreyauctions
are not more widely utilized).
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M&A auctions are probably closer to common-value than privatevalue auctions.140 Although the merger or acquisition of a company may
create different synergies for different bidders,141 most serious bidders will
probably value a company similarly-if not in stage I, then in stage II, when
they learn the bids of their competitors. Indeed, if some bidders were to
change their minds, then contrary to Theorem,'42 they might want to usurp
higher bids in an attempt to win the auction, as we discuss later.14 3
We point out that two-stage auctions differ qualitatively from onestage auctions in having an initial stage that "does not count." Of course,
this is not literally true, because the stage I bids provide the menu from
which players select their bids in stage II as well as determine the winner if
there is a tie in stage II.
Thus, if a party is the highest bidder in stage I, it can usurp any lower
bid that it thinks might be a more reasonable estimate of the common value.
If it wins, it will only have to pay this bid. By contrast, if a party is the
lowest bidder, affirming its own bid ensures that it loses, no matter what the
other parties do.
Divorcing, for the most part, what a player bids in stage I from what it
pays in stage II (if it wins) affords the parties the opportunity to be sincere in
stage I. This divorce is complete in a Vickrey auction, which is why all
parties have a dominant strategy of being sincere.'44 The divorce is not as
complete in a two-stage auction, so additional assumptions are required to
render sincere bidding in stage I optimal.
To investigate the robustness of sincerity in common-value auctions,
we need to make some assumption about the common value of a company.
Unlike one-stage auctions, we assume that a party's stage I bid will not, in
general, be determinative. On the contrary, we assume that other parties'
bids, which each party observes in stage II, not only matter but also play a
critical role in a party's choice of a stage II bid.
To give the problem greater structure, assume that the parties believe
that the best estimate of the common value of a company is the median bid
in stage I-that is, this bid is most likely to be its true value. Therefore, the
most competitive, yet still profitable, bid each party can make in stage II is to
affirm or usurp the next-lower bid to the median bid.

140See Sautter, supra note 19 (manuscript at 17-18) (discussing the difficulty in strictly
interpreting M&A auctions as either common-value or private-value auctions).
4
1' See id. at 70-71.
42
1 See supra pp. 891-93.
143See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
'"See Rothkopf, Teisberg & Khan, supra note 139, at 95 (noting that, in a Vickrey auction,
truth-revealing strategies are not only equilibrium strategies but also dominant strategies).
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The choice of the median as the best estimate in stage H is arbitrary,
even when all the other players are sincere in stage I. Moreover, the choice
of the next-lower bid as an appropriate amount to bid in stage II seems
questionable in certain situations. For example, consider the two cases, Cl
and C2, in both of which 95 is the median bid (underscored)-half the bids
lie below this bid and half above:
C l: 99, 98, 97, 96, 95, 4, 3, 2, 1
C2: 99, 98, 97, 96, 95, 94, 3, 2, 1
In Cl, the 99-party would win at 4, whereas in C2 this party would
win at 94 if, as we assume, all parties usurp (or affirm) the next-lower bid to
the median.
Notice that these vastly different bids stem from only one different bid
in the two cases. Intuition suggests that with this much on the line, parties
may invoke other estimation procedures, based on standards other than the
median.
For example, assume that the mean, which is 55 in Cl and 65 in C2, is
the best estimate. As before, the 99-player would usurp 4 as its highest
profitable bid in Cl; by comparison, in C2, the 99-player would usurp 3, not
94. Even if one believed in the median as the appropriate standard, bidding
94 in C2 seems an extremely tough call because of its enormous significance
for profits.
In a common-value two-stage auction, parties are likely to change
their minds if their bids are outliers, especially if they are on the low side.
Assume the median sincere bid is the best estimate of common value. Then
there are situations in which low bidders will leapfrog over higher bidders in
stage II, though all the parties still have an incentive to be sincere in stage II.
By the same token, if a party's bid is on the high side, it can avoid the
winner's curse by usurping the bid just below the median (if this is the best
estimate of common value), or going even lower if it wishes to bail out. In
either event, the median-or some other estimate of the common valueserves as a beacon that minimizes strategizing, leads to an appropriate
valuation of a company, which is fair to both the winning buyer and the
seller.1'

145For more details, including examples and proofs of results, see BRAMS &TAYLOR, supra
note 85, at 191-201.
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To highlight the differences between private-value and common-value
auctions, consider these two examples of sincere bids in stage I:
El: 9, 6, 5, 4
E2: 11, 10, 7, 4, 3
In a private-value auction, Theorem says that the 9-bidder in El will
usurp the 6-bid, and the 11-bidder in E2 will usurp the 10-bid, and each will
win.146 Notice in El that the 9-bidder's estimate of profit (9 - 6 = 3) is 50%
greater than its cost of 6, whereas in E2 the 11-bidder's profit (11 - 10 = 1) is
only 10% greater than its cost of 10.
In a common-value auction, the bid just below the median of 5.5 in El
is 5, the next lowest bid (out of four bids). Likewise, the bid just below the
median of 7 in E2 is 4, also the next-lowest bid (out of five bids).
It seems probable that the top bidder in each example would worry
that these just-below-the-median bids might not suffice to win. If so, it
would be inclined to go higher-bid 6 (private-value optimum) in El; bid 10
(private-value optimum) or, more likely, 7 in E2. Even if the 11-bidder in
E2 believes the median of 7 is a good estimate of common value, if it
attributes some importance to its private valuation of 11, it may surmise that
it can go to 7 with little fear of a loss and, at the same time, prevent the 10bidder from winning if it also usurps 7.147
These examples illustrate how real bidders might mix common-value
and private-value considerations to decide on the best option in stage II. The
mix they choose is likely to depend not just on expected profit but also on a
subtle weighing of short-term and long-term goals reflecting the nature of the
competition, the distribution of the bids, and other concrete and not-so-

concrete factors.148
It is hard to say what, exactly, will emerge from such a heady mix.'49
But the fact that parties have compelling reasons to submit sincere bids in
stage I-after all, they could be tie-breakers, and one does not have to stick
with them in stage I-means that the stage I bids from which the parties will
choose in stage II will, for the most part, be unadulterated by strategic

146See infra notes 147-68 and accompanying text.

147See BRAMs & TAYLOR, supranote 85, at 179 ("[Bidders] win items they genuinely value
more than other [bidders].").
148See, e.g., id. at 179 n.3 (discussing the difference that the financial circumstances of each
bidder may play in a particular auction).
149See id. at 179 n.3 ("[T]he information [bidders] learn at the conclusion of [s]tage [one]
may still leave them in a quandary . . . .").
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calculations.'" Moreover, in a common-value auction, they give the parties
an opportunity to approximate the common value-by seeing all the stage I
bids-as well as to avoid the winner's curse."5
3. Additional Benefits of the Procedure
In addition to inducing sincere bidding and improving the efficiency
of M&A auctions as a result, there are three other benefits to utilizing the
two-stage auction procedure.'52 First, it not only gives an incentive to bid
honestly in stage I, but it also removes the winner's curse in stage II,'11
yielding the results of a second-price Vickrey auction that is relatively
immune to collusion."' It also may lead to a higher settlement price than is
possible with an ordinary first-price or second-price auction."'
To see this, consider the possibility that a bidder, other than the
highest bidder in stage I, wishes to maximize its chance of winning the
auction in stage II. Such a bidder should usurp the highest bid in stage I.
While this is not the outcome our Theorem predicts, its possibility generates
uncertainty for the highest bidder in stage I-unless it affirms its stage I
bid."' So if the goal of a bidder is to win, whatever the cost, the price it pays
may be the highest stage I bid."'
The potential to induce a higher settlement price for the firm is a
substantial benefit of the two-stage auction procedure."' As we discuss in
the following Section, this is another reason why the two-stage auction
procedure should pass judicial scrutiny under the Revlon test, yielding the

"'See id at 191 ("[A] [bidder] never has to pay what he or she bids at [s]tage [one], so
[they] make no binding commitments at this stage.").
'Restricting the parties' choices to a certain menu (e.g., the stage one bids) is echoed in
final-offer arbitration (FOA), wherein the arbitrator must choose the offer of one side or the other
(he or she cannot split the difference). See Steven J. Brains & Samuel Merrill, 111,Equilibrium
Strategies in Final-OfferArbitration: There Is No Median Convergence, 29 MGMT SCl. 927, 927

(1983).

152BRAMS & TAYLOR, supranote 85, at 241 ("An auction is efficient (Pareto-optimal) if the
[bidder] with the highest valuation of an item wins it in the auction.").
53
1 See id. at 247; see also McAfee & McMillan, supra note 88, at 721 (discussing
the
assumptions that bidders must make in a common-value sealed-bid auction in order to avoid the
winner's curse).
154See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 187-88 (describing a test for ensuring that no
bids are fraudulent (i.e., inserted by confederates)).
'sSee id at 186.
See id.
57
See id
See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supranote 85, at 186.
'See id. at 200.
56
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maximum possible value for shareholders that is reasonably attainable under
the circumstances."'o Unlike other procedures, such as Povel and Singh's,''
by not only permitting all bidders to participate in a pro-competitive manner,
but also making it possible to achieve a settlement at a higher price than the
second-highest bid, our mechanism is plainly value maximizing. In fact,
given the other strengths of the procedure, we suggest that it should receive
favorable legal treatment, such as reduced judicial scrutiny, as we explain in
the following Subsection.'62
A second advantage of the two-stage auction procedure is the benefits
it brings to society, specifically: increased information, transparency, and the
stability that it produces because it is not subject to topping-off bids.' 3 The
presence of positive social externalities is a compelling reason for
lawmakers, regulators, and courts to give favorable legal treatment to
mechanism design, as we advocated in our prior piece on law and
mechanism design more generally.'" The two-stage auction procedure also
permits learning of the distribution of honest reservation prices in stage I,
which can have substantial informational benefits.' 5
For example, regulators could evaluate the difference between bidders'
reservation prices and actual bids in stage II to determine whether the
winner's curse is being prevented in practice, as well as ascertain the extent
to which the procedure facilitates higher-than-expected settlement prices for
target firms.' 6 Information regarding the distribution of reservation pricese.g., the mean, median, difference between the highest and next-highest
reservation price, and the like-could also help policymakers in setting tax
policy, for example, or otherwise determine whether purchase prices in the
takeover market reflect an efficient allocation of social resources.' 7
Similarly, it would give courts a better understanding of the environment for
the transaction in subsequent litigation.' 6

60

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.

1986).

' 6'Povel & Singh, supra note 106, at 1400.
162See infra Part 1H.C.
163See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 196.

164See Brams & Mitts, supra note 11 (manuscript at 26, 34-35) (discussing the benefits of
mechanism design for legal and regulatory policymaking and inducing optimal levels of private
contracting).
' 65See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 200.

166See id. at 191 (discussing the importance of exploiting as much information as possible
before settling on a bidding strategy to avoid the winner's curse).
1See, e.g., Brams & Mitts, supranote 11 (manuscript at 26,34-35) (discussing how a twostep procedure would provide help improve regulatory policy).
68
' See id. (addressing the inferences that can be made about future auctions based on
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What is especially important in light of the recent controversy over
DADW standstills is that the two-stage auction procedure promotes stability
in the M&A auction environment by removing any incentive for bidders to
bypass the formal auction process by placing topping bids.' One of the
most compelling strengths of the two-stage procedure is that it is not in a
party's interest to bypass the procedure, because all parties are made privy to
the bids before they need to make a choice in stage II and so are not deprived
of information about the competition.'
No party can assuredlybe made better off by usurping a higher bid,
because the higher bidder, by affirming, can always beat the usurping
bidder."' By giving parties an opportunity to adjust their stage I bids in light
of learning the other stage I bids, the winner's curse is neutralized, providing
the benefits of a second-price auction that is relatively immune to collusion
while giving the company the benefit of bidders' uncertainty about who will
emerge on top.'72

Finally, the two-stage mechanism is truly fair to all parties, because it
gives each an escape valve. It allows the company to put in a reserve price
and use that price to back out,"' and for the bidders to back out by usurping
the lowest first-stage bid in the second stage of the procedure.'74 In addition,
it does not discriminate between bidders, which is likely to have instrumental
benefits."' For example, it is likely to mitigate agency costs by preventing
management from arbitrarily favoring certain bidders instead of promoting
shareholder value. As we explain in the next Subsection, we suggest that
these benefits of utilizing the two-stage auction procedure-not only to firms
and bidders but to society more broadly-render it worthy of reduced
judicial scrutiny."'
C. Legal Treatment of the Two-Stage Auction Procedure
There are two aspects to the legal treatment of the two-stage auction
procedure. First, the potential for unfavorable legal treatment of the
mechanism by the Delaware courts might deter target firms and bidders from
observing previous two-step auctions).
''See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181.
70

See id.
' 7'See id. at 181, 191-192.
112See id. at 181.
'"See CASSADY JR., supra note 128, at 57.
174To be sure, ifall but the lowest bidder usurps the lowest bid, the highest ofthese usurpers

will win, but at a presumably much reduced price which, if below the seller's reserve, would enable
even this bidder to bail out. See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 199.
'"See id.
'See infra Part II.C.
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its use."' To dispel these concerns, we show how the procedure maximizes
shareholder value and often yields a sale price higher than sealed-bid
auctions currently in use today."' Second, we suggest that the positive social
externalities of utilizing the procedure described in the preceding Section
justify favorable legal treatment and so encourage firms that might not be
inclined to utilize the procedure due to unfamiliarity, uncertainty, or various
cognitive biases."'
1. Maximizing Shareholder Value
With respect to the first concern, it is essential to demonstrate that, as
a legal matter, use of the two-stage auction procedure would not run afoul of
a board's Revlon duties to maximize the sale price for a firm undergoing a
change-of-control transaction.' Indeed, we know of no practicable auction
procedure that is more value-maximizing than the mechanism we have
proposed. Consider, for example, the Povel and Singh procedure, which
relies on a non-competitive series of exclusive negotiations."' The absence
of competitive bidding in their first stage seems far less likely to obtain the
highest possible price for shareholders than our procedure, which not only
invites bids from all potential bidders but induces the honest disclosure of
reservation prices in the first stage, allowing the target firm to discover the
range of prices that potential buyers are willing to pay for the firm.'82 With
Povel and Singh's procedure, the board must believe that the sequential
negotiation will yield the highest price;' with our procedure, the distribution
of reservation prices is known to all at the conclusion of stage I.'"'
Furthermore, our procedure is more value maximizing than the
unstructured ad hoc approach currently employed in M&A auctions.' As
we showed in Section III.A., in a sealed-bid auction, bidders have an
incentive to shade their bids in order to avoid the winner's curse.'"' This
means that the winning bid is pushed below, sometimes substantially, the

'"See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.

1986).
"'See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; BRAMS & TAYLOR, supranote 85, at 198.
79
' See supra Part II.B.
'Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.

18 'See Povel & Singh, supra note 106, at 1409-10.
182See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181.
83
1 Povel & Singh, supra note 106, at 1409-10.
184BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181.
' 8 See id.at 199.
86
1 See supra Part Bi.A.
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reservation price of the winning bidder.'" As a concrete example, consider
the hypothetical bidders A and B in Section III.A."I One might object to our
claim that the two-stage auction procedure is value-maximizing by pointing
out that if A and B reveal their true reservation prices of $50 and $40,
respectively in stage I, A will usurp B by bidding $40. A sale price of $40 is
worse than A's bid of $42 if A chooses a bid that slightly exceeds the
expected value of B's bids, based on A's probability distribution over B's
bids that we postulated earlier.
However, there are two problems with this critique. First, A's
estimation of B's expected reservation price at $42 was only a hypothetical
example-it is entirely possible that A is far less accurate in its estimation of
B's reservation price, and consequently bids below B's reservation price, e.g.,
at a price of $35/share.'" A may still win the auction if B does likewise by
bidding a still lower $30. The potential for highly suboptimal shading as a
result of misestimating other bidders' reservation prices renders the sealedbid auction one of cascading lower bids to try to ensure a profit if the bidder
wins."' On the other hand, by inducing the honest disclosure of reservation
prices, the two-stage procedure is relatively immune to this problem,
producing a winning bid that is no less than the second-highest bidder's
reservation price."'
The second problem with this critique is that unlike a traditional
second-price auction, our procedure not only removes the winner's curse but
also "channels" uncertainty to the benefit of the target firm.'" The highest
bidder in stage I, who wishes to be absolutely certain that it will emerge
victorious, may choose to affirm its bid, and other bidders will have some
incentive to try to usurp higher bids, sometimes yielding the company a
higher sale price than the second-highest bid while still precluding the
winner's curse.'
Note that because all bids are on the table in stage II, no bidder is in
the dark about where it stands vis-i-vis the other bidders.'94 On the other
hand, there remains uncertainty about what it takes to win, which will induce

7

18 See
88

Athey, Levin, & Porter, supra note 72, at 208-09.

1 See supra Part lIB.A.
89
See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 199.
90
See Athey, Levin, & Porter, supra note 72, at 208-09.
' 9 'See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181-82.
92

1

Id.

93

See id.

94

1 See id.
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the bidders to make their best offers in light of the knowledge they acquired
in stage I.'"
This is particularly likely to be the case when our procedure is utilized
repeatedly. Consider the original example of A and B with reservation
prices of $50 and $40, respectively, and A's estimation of B's reservation
price at $41.75. If A affirms its highest bid 20% of the time, our procedure
yields a higher expected sale price than the sealed-bid auction gives.'"
In our view, these two reasons demonstrate that the two-stage auction
procedure is value-maximizing for target firms; without doubt, they satisfy
the Revlon test of obtaining "the best value reasonably available to the
stockholders.""' Accordingly, there is no reason to question whether use of
the procedure will pass judicial scrutiny in subsequent shareholder litigation.
2. Favorable Judicial Treatment
At first glance, the need for favorable legal treatment of the two-stage
auction procedure seems misplaced for the simple reason that underlies why
mechanism design is such a compelling approach: incentive compatibility.
By structuring the parties' incentives to remove the winner's curse and
potentially yield a higher sale price for the target firm, the two-stage auction
mechanism aligns use of the procedure with the interests of all of the
parties.'" Accordingly, fully rational sellers and bidders should be attracted
to the mechanism, whether or not courts give it favorable treatment.
However, it is possible that cognitive biases may impede use of the
procedure, at least in the initial period. In light of the social benefits of the
mechanism-information, transparency, stability, and fairness-we suggest
that Delaware courts should not only find that the procedure comports with a
board's Revlon duties but should also apply reduced judicial scrutiny.'" This
could be as simple as applying the business judgment rule to sales utilizing
the procedure, giving the company's board a presumption that it fulfilled its
duty of care.200 This may only be rebutted by showing the decision to utilize

'"See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 181-82.

' 96Usurping $40 80% of the time and affirming $50 20% of the time yields an expected
value of ($40)(.8) + ($50)(0.2) = $42 > $41.75.
'"Paramount Comm'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1993); see also
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
'"See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 198-99.
'"See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
200

See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business judgment rule
exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors.").
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the two-stage auction procedure was uninformed or made in bad faith.201
This would give firms a strong incentive to utilize the two-stage auction
procedure, benefitting society by providing policymakers with information
regarding the distribution of reservation prices and promoting increased
transparency, stability, and fairness in M&A auctions.202
An additional aspect of reduced judicial scrutiny relates to
mechanisms by which the board may enforce use of the procedure and
prevent subsequent topping bids. 203 As we have explained, the mechanism
mandates that the target firm consummate a transaction with the winning
bidder, precluding the possibility of subsequent topping bids.2" While the
incentive-compatible nature of the mechanism implies that no rational party
should attempt to bypass the procedure and place a topping bid expost, it is
possible that interlopers may nonetheless arise for a variety of reasons, e.g.,
due to cognitive biases or even animus.
Accordingly, we suggest that the value-maximizing and socially
beneficial aspects of the procedure justify reduced judicial scrutiny of
standstills-even DADW standstills-that ensure that all potential bidders
utilize the two-stage auction procedure. Again, these should be largely
unnecessary, because unlike one-shot sealed bid auctions, the two-stage
procedure is value-maximizing and prevents the winner's curse, giving firms
a natural incentive to participate. 20 5 But to the extent that boards wish to
obtain additional protection against an undermining of the two-stage auction
procedure, we suggest that Delaware courts apply reduced scrutiny to
standstills utilized solely for this procedure. Indeed, providing an impetus to
the two-stage auction mechanism is precisely the type of "value-maximizing
purpose" that Chancellor Strine envisioned in Ancestry.com as a legitimate
use of a DADW standstill.206 Unlike the ad hoc nature of prohibiting topping
bids made after a sealed-bid auction, standstills that encourage participation
in the two-stage auction promote value maximization in an analytically
rigorous way.207

201See id. ("[T]he party attacking a board decision as uninformed must rebut the
presumption that its business judgment was an informed one.").
202
See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 198-99.
203See supra Part II.B (discussing the recent controversy over "Don't Ask, Don't Waive"
Provisions).
204See BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 198-99.
2051d

206
See Transcript of the Court's Ruling on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at
23, In re Ancestry.com Inc. Sholder Litig., C.A. No. 7988-CS (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 2012).
207

See id
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IV. CONCLUSION
We have shown that mechanism design can inform the development
of a two-stage auction procedure for M&A transactions that reduces many of
the inefficiencies inherent in the current one-stage sealed-bid format.
Instead of a relying solely on standstills and other ad hoc instruments to
prevent post-signing topping bids, target firms can employ a structured
procedure that renders participation in the auction incentive-compatible and
also enables bidders to avoid the winner's curse.208 Moreover, the two-stage
auction procedure comports with a target firm's Revlon duties by making it
possible to obtain a higher price than in a sealed-bid auction.209
Moreover, we believe that the benefits to society from utilizing the
two-stage auction procedure justify granting it favorable legal treatment in
the form of reduced judicial scrutiny. Specifically, applying the business
judgment rule to two-stage auctions would give firms a powerful incentive to
overcome cognitive biases and utilize the procedure. Society would be
better off from greater information, transparency, stability, and fairness in
M&A auctions.
Indeed, as we showed in our first piece on law and mechanism design,
focusing on rendering incentives compatible through structured procedures
represents a legal paradigm shift-from evaluating substantive contract
conditions to considering "the structural conditions under which such
agreement takes place."210 M&A auctions are a prime example of settings in
which the legal rules traditionally have been focused on the limits of
acceptable types of contracts-i.e., which types of deal protections violate a
board's fiduciary duty to maximize the sale price under Revlon.2 1 However,
as the two-stage auction procedure demonstrates, incorporating structured
mechanisms for contract formation can enhance shareholder value and
facilitate an open, transparent, and stable bidding process in M&A auctions
by rendering participation in the bidders' interests.212

20

sSee BRAMS & TAYLOR, supra note 85, at 196.

209

See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.

1986).

210
2

Brams & Mitts, supra note 11 (manuscript at 47).

1lSee Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.

212Two-stage auctions could also be used to determine the buyer of a company instead of
other ad hoc, destabilizing mechanisms for value maximization such as "go shops," which are often
used in private-equity transactions. See Steven M. Davidoff, FlawedBidding ProcessLeaves Dell
at a Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/a-flawed-biddingprocess-leaves-dell-at-a-loss/.
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In this Article, we have attempted to demonstrate the power of
mechanism design and incentive compatibility to open up a new paradigm of
contractual formation in the M&A context. However, mechanism design is
much broader in scope and could be incorporated in numerous areas of law,
such as alternative dispute resolution."' It is our hope that the simple
application of mechanism design in this Article will inspire further research
to develop procedures that reduce inefficiencies and render outcomes
compatible with the parties' interests.

213See, e.g., Brams & Mitts supranote 11 (manuscript at 17) (applying mechanism design to
settlement negotiations).

